

I wish to address the following matters that have not been resolved to my satisfaction:

* In relation to traffic & transport, the Applicant has refused, despite having had plenty of time, to assess the impact of increased traffic & transport on the basis of correct baseline date, using neutral months and also allowing for peaks such as the Easter and summer holidays.

* The Applicant has completely failed both to conduct adequate assessment work on the impact on tourism and the local economy, including carrying out quantitative attitudinal work timeously. This means that the ExA is left without sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion.

*In relation to the need for Sea Link, the Applicant has simply not made a sufficient case.

Finally, I wish to object in the strongest possible terms to AS-167 that has been put forward by the Applicant at the very last minute.

This proposal seeks to introduce, at a very late stage in the Examination, a mechanism by which an unspecified future unit within the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (“DESNZ”) could assume responsibility for the discharge of Development Consent Order (DCO) Requirements. In doing so, it would remove decision-making powers from the relevant local authorities in Suffolk and reduce them to the role of consultees.

This represents a fundamental and unjustified change to the governance of the project during the DCO process. This is totally in breach of established procedures and the ExA should reject it totally.

Nature of the Proposed Change

AS-167 is not a minor procedural refinement. It is a material change that would:

- %| Transfer decision-making authority away from democratically accountable local authorities;

- %| Introduce a hypothetical body that does not yet exist, with no defined statutory safeguards;

- %| Replace a well-understood and tested system for discharging DCO Requirements with a new, untested mechanism.

Such a proposal alters the balance of control embedded within the DCO framework and therefore goes to the heart of how the project would be regulated post-consent.

Procedural Unfairness and Examination Integrity

The timing of AS-167 raises serious concerns:

- %| It has been introduced late in the Examination, limiting the ability of Interested Parties to comment;

- %| There has been no meaningful consultation on this proposed governance change;

- %| The implications have not been fully tested through hearings or evidence.

This undermines the integrity of the Examination process overseen by the Planning Inspectorate and risks prejudicing Interested Parties.

A change of this magnitude should have been presented at an early stage, with full consultation and supporting evidence.

Bringing it forward now is procedurally inappropriate.

Erosion of Local Democratic Accountability

Under the current DCO regime, local authorities play a critical role in the discharge of Requirements because they:

- %| Possess detailed local knowledge of communities, infrastructure, environment and local circumstances;

- %| Are democratically accountable to the communities most affected;

- %| Provide a vital check on the implementation of nationally significant infrastructure projects.

AS-167 would:

- %| Remove local authorities’ decision-making powers;

- %| Reduce them to consultees with no determinative role;

- %| Centralise control in a remote body lacking local accountability.

This is a clear erosion of local democracy and runs counter to the principles underpinning the Planning Act 2008 regime.

Lack of Clarity, Certainty, and Safeguards

The proposal is fundamentally flawed due to its lack of definition:

- %| The DESNZ unit does not yet exist;

- %| Its legal powers, governance structure, and decision-making processes are unclear;

- %| There are no defined procedures, timelines, or appeal mechanisms;

- %| There is no clarity as to how transparency or accountability would be ensured.

Granting consent on the basis of such uncertainty would be inappropriate and contrary to the requirement for robust, enforceable, and clearly defined controls within a DCO.

Risks to Effective Oversight and Mitigation

Removing local authority control over Requirement discharge creates real risks:

- %| Weaker scrutiny of detailed design, construction impacts, and mitigation measures;

- %| Reduced responsiveness to site-specific issues, including traffic, ecology, and local concerns;

- %| Increased likelihood that commitments made during the Examination are not met.

Given the scale and sensitivity of the Sea Link project—particularly in areas such as Suffolk—this loss of local oversight is unacceptable.

Absence of Evidence or Justification

The Applicant has provided no compelling evidence that:

- %| The current system for discharging Requirements is inadequate;

- %| Local authorities are incapable of fulfilling their role;

- %| The proposed alternative would deliver better outcomes.

In the absence of such evidence, AS-167 appears to be an attempt to avoid local scrutiny, rather than a justified improvement to the regulatory framework.

Precedent and Wider Implications

If accepted, AS-167 would set a concerning precedent:

- %| It would allow applicants to re-engineer governance arrangements late in the Examination process;

- %| It could be used in future NSIPs to systematically sideline local authorities;

%I It risks undermining confidence in the DCO process more broadly.
The Examining Authority should be particularly cautious about endorsing such a departure from established practice.

Conclusion and Request

For the reasons set out above, AS-167 is:

%I A material and unjustified late change;

%I Procedurally unfair;

%I Lacking in clarity, evidence, and safeguards;

%I Damaging to local democratic accountability; and

%I Contrary to the principles of the DCO regime.

I therefore respectfully request that the Examining Authority recommends that AS-167 be rejected in full.